Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 3 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 2

January 2010

Introduction
Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Recommended Citation
Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, Introduction, 40 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2010).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol40/iss3/2

This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Wardlaw: Introduction

INTRODUCTION
THE HONORABLE KIM MCLANE WARDLAW*

“Constitutions should consist only of general provisions,”
Alexander Hamilton once explained.1 “The reason is, that they
must necessarily be permanent, and that they cannot calculate for
the possible change of things.”2 As the Framers predicted,
“things” certainly have changed. In 1791, when the Bill of Rights
was ratified, much correspondence was sent by horseback, often
taking days to reach its final destination. I personally recall the
days when – as an attorney in private practice – I would carefully
draft a letter to opposing counsel, drop it in the mail, and not
expect a response for weeks. Today, with the advent of the
Internet and the invention of text messaging, written
communications are transmitted instantaneously over a truly
worldwide network. How do the “general provisions” of the Fourth
Amendment apply to modes of communication sent via
technologies that were likely beyond the wildest imagination of the
Founders? And how can we ensure that our answers to today’s
legal questions provide principled guidance to future jurists called
upon to address issues arising from tomorrow’s technological
developments? We, after all, are no more capable of predicting
the course of future technological change than were the Framers.
At the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, we often consider the
application of the Constitution’s “general provisions” to new
technologies. When we do, we not only resolve the question
before us, but we necessarily contribute to the doctrinal framework
within which future technologies will be considered. For instance,
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Alexander Hamilton, Third Speech at New York Ratifying Convention (June 28,
1788), in 5 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 114, 118 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).
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in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc.,3 we had to decide
whether a police department acted unconstitutionally when it
searched personal text messages that its officers sent or received
on two-way pagers. As we considered the question, we observed
that “[t]he extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides
protection for the contents of electronic communications in the
Internet age is an open question,” and that the “recently minted
standard of electronic communication via e-mails, text messages,
and other means opens a new frontier in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.”4 In exploring this “new frontier,” we were not
without guidance, however. We began our constitutional analysis
by citing the text of the Fourth Amendment, and we proceeded to
apply the lessons of existing precedent to this relatively new form
of communication.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address this issue – not because there exists an inter-circuit split,
as this question has been decided only by the Ninth Circuit – but
most likely because of the importance of defining reasonable
expectations of privacy in the information age. (The Quon opinion
also was the first in the nation to decide whether a wireless
service was an “electronic communication service” under the
Stored Communications Act, an issue that the Supreme Court did
not take up for decision.).
The past year has provided us many more opportunities to
explore these new frontiers. In United States v. Payton,6 – the
subject of an article in this edition of the Golden Gate University
Law Review – and United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing,
Inc.,7 we examined the constitutionality of searches of information
electronically stored on personal and proprietary computers. In
each case, we revisited first principles established in the
Constitution, examined case law interpreting the constitutional
provisions at issue, and applied that body of doctrine to new facts.
Similarly, in Bryan v. McPherson,8 – the subject of another
article in this edition – we considered the constitutional
implications of a police officer’s use of the Taser X26, a stun gun
that uses compressed nitrogen to propel electrically charged
aluminum darts toward its target. To nobody’s surprise, the
3

Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 904.
5
Id. at 904–05.
6
United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009).
7
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (2009) (en
4

banc).
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Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767 (9th Cir 2009).
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Constitution lacks explicit instructions on the circumstances under
which this state-of-the-art law enforcement tool lawfully may be
deployed. But it does provide us with guiding principles, the
foundation upon which case law has developed. Thus, in Bryan,
we returned to the analytical framework of Graham v. Connor,9
and its progeny, which instructed us to consider the government’s
interest in the use of the Taser, which, in turn, depended on the
severity of the crime at issue, the immediacy of any threat
imposed by the suspect, and the suspect’s resistance to arrest.
The invention of the Taser was not license for the courts to
remake the law – a task exclusively within the province of the
people and their elected representatives – but was instead a
reason to apply existing law to new law enforcement technology.
Technological innovations often present our court with
interesting issues of local governance as well. Last year, in Sprint
v. Palos Verdes,10 we were called upon to examine the extent of
municipalities’ authority to regulate the placement and aesthetics
of cellular telephone towers in light of a federal statute enacted to
facilitate the development of wireless services. In analyzing the
federal, state, and local laws governing the issue, we took note of
the longstanding “tension between technological advancement
and community aesthetics.”11 Similarly, today, we are currently
considering the extent to which a city may regulate state-of-the-art
billboards, including “supergraphic signs” and displays featuring
digital content.12
There is no doubt that, given its large population, geographic
reach, and the diverse, creative and innovative people and
industries within its jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
will continue to be among the first in the nation to address legal
questions involving novel technologies. However, technological
change does not come to the Ninth Circuit exclusively in the form
of legal issues which we are called upon to resolve. I am proud to
say that our court has embraced new technologies to improve the
administration of justice in a myriad of ways. Litigants are now
able to file documents electronically, saving time and resources.
Web-based streaming media permit members of the public to
observe oral arguments even when they are unable to attend

9

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Sprint v. Palos Verdes, 583 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2009).
11
Id. at 720.
12
See World Wide Rush v. City of Los Angeles, No. 08-56454 (argued and
submitted December 10, 2009).
10
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proceedings in person. This is especially useful as our en banc
proceedings, held typically in San Francisco or Pasadena, are
streamed to public conference areas in each of our courthouses.
Beginning the day after an oral argument is heard, a digitized
audio recording is made available on our court’s public web site.
We have also begun to allow the media to use electronic devices
for blogging, tweeting, and other realtime reporting from the
courtroom. Our court library compiles and distributes a daily
digest of media coverage and blog entries summarizing public
discussions of our work. Overall, innovations in the employment
of technology instituted under the strong leadership of Chief Judge
Kozinski have ensured greater transparency and efficiency of our
judicial proceedings.
Behind the scenes, email and word
processing systems – tools that, not long ago, were unavailable to
judges – have facilitated dialogue and debate among members of
our court.
Most of our judges have themselves become
technologically savvy and can be seen with an array of courtissued laptops, mobile devices, cellular telephones, and other
means of staying in contact 24/7 as we “ride circuit.”
In a world of constantly changing technologies, it is important
that we periodically take time to stop and reflect on the product of
our vast and evolving dockets. I am grateful to the Golden Gate
University Law Review for its annual examination of some of our
most important decisions from each preceding year, which sit at
the intersection of law and technology and elsewhere. I look
forward to reading the 2010 edition and hope others will take the
opportunity to learn about our court’s most recent decisions.
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